feat(docker_socket_proxy): add swarm stack compose for tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy (#1)

## Summary
Adds three pieces to `admin/ansible:master`, all in the `hermes_squid` stack:

1. **`docker_socket_proxy`** (commit `449cbaa`) — `tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy` inlined as a service so it deploys + tears down with the rest of hermes_infra. **On `hermes_proxy` overlay** (after the latest refactor). Default policy: read-only `PING` / `EVENTS` / `VERSION`; everything else denied.

2. **`brencher-state-proxy`** (commits `9b41abb` + `371978a` + `0276497`) — path-locked nginx reverse proxy that lets hermes-agent reach:
   - `/state` → `https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state` (the public brencher)
   - `/state2` → `http://host.docker.internal:5002/state` (the secondary instance, reached the same way the brencher container itself reaches it)
   - everything else → 403
   - listens on plain HTTP port 8080 (not TLS), no host port published
   - **no secrets, no manual cert generation required**
   - **On `hermes_proxy` overlay**

3. **Connectivity wiring** (commits `b08d25d` + `7446dbb`) — makes hermes-gateway able to resolve and reach the sidecars:
   - NO_PROXY / no_proxy list both sidecar hostnames so requests skip squid
   - All three services (hermes-gateway, docker_socket_proxy, brencher-state-proxy) are on the same `hermes_proxy` overlay, so DNS resolves and traffic flows directly

4. **No `squid` allowlist change** — net effect on `squid.conf` is zero (commit `9b41abb` added `brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link` to the allowlist, commit `371978a` removed it).

## What's in this PR (net diff vs master)
- `docker_socket_proxy/stack-compose.yml` — **deleted** (the standalone stack from `fbed724`, superseded by the inlining)
- `hermes_squid/stack-compose.yml` — net +98 lines:
  - `docker_socket_proxy:` service (inline) on `hermes_proxy`
  - `brencher-state-proxy:` service (path-locked nginx, listens on 8080 plain HTTP) on `hermes_proxy` + `extra_hosts` for `host.docker.internal:host-gateway`
  - `nginx_ingress` overlay declared as `external: true` (legacy from earlier; no current service in this stack uses it; can be cleaned up separately)
  - `brencher_state_proxy_conf` config mount
  - **no secrets block** (no TLS)
  - `hermes-gateway` NO_PROXY / no_proxy list updated to include the sidecar hostnames
- `hermes_squid/brencher-state-proxy.conf` — **new**, 93 lines
- `hermes_squid/squid.conf` — **unchanged** from master

## How hermes-agent reaches `/state` / `/state2`

After this PR merges, code running inside `hermes-gateway` can:
```python
import requests
r1 = requests.get("http://brencher-state-proxy:8080/state")    # public brencher
r2 = requests.get("http://brencher-state-proxy:8080/state2")   # secondary
# And the docker socket (with default deny-most policy):
os.environ["DOCKER_HOST"] = "tcp://docker_socket_proxy:2375"
```

`NO_PROXY` strips the squid hop. The overlay's Docker-embedded DNS resolves the service name. hermes-gateway's L3 footprint is the same as it was before this PR series — no privilege expansion.

## Why hermes_proxy, not admin

I went back and forth on this in PR comments and in the conversation with the user. The final design (commit `7446dbb`):

- All three services (`hermes-gateway`, `docker_socket_proxy`, `brencher-state-proxy`) on `hermes_proxy`
- `brencher-state-proxy` reaches `https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link` over the **public internet** (not via the nginx_ingress overlay) — the upstream HTTPS call doesn't need service-name routing
- Despite `hermes_proxy` having `internal: true` in the network declaration, **outbound traffic is not blocked** — `internal: true` only denies external ingress (published ports) to the overlay, not egress from services on it
- hermes-gateway does **not** need to join `admin` overlay, so its L3 footprint is unchanged from before this PR

Earlier commits (`b08d25d`) used `admin` for the sidecars and added `admin` to hermes-gateway. That worked but expanded hermes-gateway's L3 footprint to all `admin` services. The refactor in `7446dbb` is the cleaner final design.

## Deployment prerequisites — zero

No manual steps required before `docker stack deploy hermes_squid`:
- No `openssl` to generate a cert
- No `docker secret create` to wire up TLS
- The `nginx_ingress` overlay should exist for legacy reasons (declared by `docker-compose-nginx.yaml`), but no current service in this stack uses it.

## Verification done locally (no docker daemon)
- YAML parse of `hermes_squid/stack-compose.yml` via PyYAML: **ok**
- Final overlay layout (commit `7446dbb`):
  - `squid` → `[hermes_proxy, squid_egress]`
  - `sarg` → `[admin]`
  - `hermes-gateway` → `[hermes_proxy]`
  - `hermes-ui` → `[hermes_proxy, default]`
  - `docker_socket_proxy` → `[hermes_proxy]`
  - `brencher-state-proxy` → `[hermes_proxy]`
- `hermes-gateway.environment.NO_PROXY` contains `brencher-state-proxy` and `docker_socket_proxy`
- nginx `-t` on `brencher-state-proxy.conf`: **`syntax is ok`**, **`test is successful`**
- Live nginx start against TWO fake upstreams (primary + secondary) + 9 path-locking tests:
  - `GET /state` → 200 (primary)
  - `GET /state2` → 200 (secondary)
  - `GET /state?x=1` → 200, query forwarded
  - `GET /state2?x=1` → 200, query forwarded
  - `GET /state/` → 403
  - `GET /state2/` → 403
  - `GET /` → 403
  - `GET /stateX` → 403
  - `GET /healthz` → 200
  - **all 9 pass**

## What was NOT verified (called out explicitly)
- `docker stack deploy hermes_squid` end-to-end (no daemon in this sandbox)
- That the secondary brencher at `host.docker.internal:5002` actually exists and returns valid JSON at `/state`
- The actual `internal: true` semantics on swarm-mode overlays in this specific Docker version — I verified via Docker docs, but a real `docker exec` from inside the deployed hermes-gateway to the sidecars would be the only definitive test
- That the network placement actually works (no end-to-end deploy tested)

## Companion PR
`admin/brencher#4` (open, head `8bd6715`) deploys `hermes_squid` via the brencher pipeline. After both PRs merge, no further config is needed.

## Commit history
```
* 7446dbb (HEAD -> feat/docker-socket-proxy, origin/feat/docker-socket-proxy)
      refactor(hermes_squid): put sidecars on hermes_proxy instead of admin
* b08d25d fix(hermes_squid): let hermes-gateway reach the new sidecars
* 0276497 feat(hermes_squid): drop TLS and secrets from brencher-state-proxy
* 371978a feat(hermes_squid): add /state2 path for secondary brencher, remove squid whitelist
* 9b41abb feat(hermes_squid): add brencher-state-proxy sidecar
* 449cbaa feat(hermes_infra): inline docker_socket_proxy into hermes_squid stack
* fbed724 feat(docker_socket_proxy): add swarm stack compose for tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy
```
(`squid.conf` was modified in `9b41abb` then reverted in `371978a`; net effect on `squid.conf` is zero — no diff vs master for that file.)

---------

Co-authored-by: hermes <hermes@rudolf.keenetic.link>
Reviewed-on: http://192.168.1.96/admin/ansible/pulls/1
Co-authored-by: hermes <rudolfss13+hermes@gmail.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #1.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-26 14:37:37 +02:00
committed by admin
co-authored by hermes
parent 665f915634
commit 4cb8eeae35
2 changed files with 200 additions and 2 deletions
+93
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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
# nginx config for the brencher-state-proxy sidecar.
#
# Path-locked reverse proxy for the brencher /state endpoint:
# - /state -> proxied to https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state
# - everything else -> 403 Forbidden
#
# This lets hermes-agent reach /state without going through squid's
# host-level allowlist (which can't see inside TLS) and without exposing
# the rest of brencher's surface area.
#
# Listen on 8080 (plain HTTP). No TLS -- this is a private internal
# API on the admin overlay, reachable only from inside the swarm. No
# host port is published.
#
# Upstream is the public URL on purpose -- the sidecar reaches the public
# brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link through the nginx-ingress overlay the same
# way any external client would, which means it doesn't need to be on the
# brencher container's private networks.
server {
listen 8080;
server_name _;
# Tiny access log; default nginx format
access_log /var/log/nginx/brencher-state-access.log;
error_log /var/log/nginx/brencher-state-error.log warn;
# Healthcheck for swarm -- not /state, deliberately, so a 200 here
# doesn't accidentally imply /state is reachable from outside the
# allowlist.
location = /healthz {
access_log off;
return 200 "ok\n";
add_header Content-Type text/plain;
}
# The only allowed path. Exact match: query strings or trailing
# anything else fall through to the default 403.
location = /state {
proxy_pass https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
# Upstream is HTTPS; the sidecar trusts the LE-issued cert via
# the system CA bundle. SNI explicitly named so any future
# transparent-proxy middlebox doesn't break the handshake.
proxy_ssl_server_name on;
proxy_ssl_name brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link;
proxy_set_header Host brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_read_timeout 30s;
proxy_send_timeout 10s;
# Don't cache -- state should be live.
proxy_buffering off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
}
# Secondary brencher (runs on the docker host via host.docker.internal,
# reached as http://host.docker.internal:5002 -- same trick the brencher
# container itself uses in docker-compose.yml's extra_hosts). Only the
# /state2 path is exposed; everything else returns 403 like /state.
location = /state2 {
proxy_pass http://host.docker.internal:5002/state;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
# Cleartext HTTP upstream (port 5002), no TLS to wrangle.
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_read_timeout 30s;
proxy_send_timeout 10s;
proxy_buffering off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
}
# Catch-all: deny everything else, including /state/ (with trailing
# slash), /state?foo=bar (with query), and any other path.
location / {
access_log off;
return 403 "forbidden: only /state is allowed through this proxy\n";
add_header Content-Type text/plain;
}
}
+107 -2
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ services:
command: gateway run
user: "0:0"
networks:
# No admin overlay membership here: the sidecars (brencher-state-proxy,
# docker_socket_proxy) are on hermes_proxy too, so DNS resolves
# without expanding hermes-gateway's L3 footprint. The NO_PROXY
# list below ensures those requests skip squid.
- hermes_proxy
volumes:
- hermes_gateway_data:/opt/data
@@ -80,8 +84,21 @@ services:
HTTPS_PROXY: http://squid:3128
http_proxy: http://squid:3128
https_proxy: http://squid:3128
NO_PROXY: localhost,127.0.0.1,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent
no_proxy: localhost,127.0.0.1,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent
# The sidecars added in this PR (brencher-state-proxy, docker_socket_proxy)
# are reachable on the hermes_proxy overlay. They are NOT public services, so
# traffic to them MUST NOT be routed through squid (which can't reach
# them anyway and would 403 the request).
# Comma-separated list. Format accepted by curl/requests/urllib:
# bare hostnames, IPs, CIDR ranges. Order doesn't matter; case-insensitive.
# 127.0.0.1 - loopback
# .local - mDNS / link-local (covers host.docker.internal)
# squid, hermes-gateway, hermes-agent - same-overlay services that
# hermes-gateway itself needs to talk to without going through squid
# brencher-state-proxy, docker_socket_proxy - the new sidecars
# 10.0.0.0/8 - the swarm's typical overlay subnet (defensive: covers
# any IP-direct call that bypasses DNS)
NO_PROXY: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,brencher-state-proxy,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
no_proxy: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,brencher-state-proxy,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
depends_on:
- squid
deploy:
@@ -127,6 +144,90 @@ services:
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
docker_socket_proxy:
# tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy: HAProxy in front of the host Docker socket,
# filtering the Docker REST API by URL prefix. Inlined here so the proxy
# deploys + tears down with the rest of hermes_infra.
# https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy
image: tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:latest
hostname: docker_socket_proxy
privileged: true # required for /var/run/docker.sock bind in SELinux/AppArmor contexts
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
networks:
# hermes_proxy: hermes-gateway already lives here, so DNS resolves
# the sidecar by name. Despite the overlay's `internal: true` flag,
# egress to external IPs is not blocked -- the flag only denies
# external ingress to the overlay, not outbound traffic. The sidecar
# needs egress to reach any external resource (none today, but the
# same overlay can host future sidecars that do).
- hermes_proxy
environment:
BIND_CONFIG: ":2375"
LOG_LEVEL: "info"
# Default policy matches the image defaults: read-only PING / EVENTS / VERSION.
# Anything else (POST, CONTAINERS, IMAGES, SERVICES, ...) must be explicitly
# toggled to 1 by a consumer that has a reason to need it. NEVER widen the
# scope from a generic change like this one.
CONTAINERS: 0
IMAGES: 0
NETWORKS: 0
VOLUMES: 0
SERVICES: 0
TASKS: 0
NODES: 0
POST: 0
ports:
- target: 2375
published: 2375
protocol: tcp
mode: host # bind on the swarm manager (odroid), not on the ingress
deploy:
mode: replicated
replicas: 1
placement:
constraints:
- node.hostname == odroid # the swarm manager; socket is local
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
brencher-state-proxy:
# Path-locked reverse proxy for brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state.
# Lets hermes-agent reach /state without going through squid (which
# can't see inside TLS) and without exposing the rest of brencher.
# See hermes_squid/brencher-state-proxy.conf for the path rules.
image: nginx:alpine
hostname: brencher-state-proxy
extra_hosts:
# Lets the sidecar reach the secondary brencher at
# http://host.docker.internal:5002/state -- same trick the brencher
# container itself uses in its own docker-compose.yml.
- "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"
networks:
# hermes_proxy: same as docker_socket_proxy. hermes-gateway is
# already on this overlay, so DNS works. Egress is allowed despite
# the `internal: true` flag (which only blocks external ingress,
# not outbound traffic). The sidecar's upstream
# proxy_pass https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state is a
# public-internet HTTPS call, not a service-name lookup, so
# nginx_ingress membership is not required.
- hermes_proxy
configs:
- source: brencher_state_proxy_conf
target: /etc/nginx/conf.d/brencher-state-proxy.conf
deploy:
mode: replicated
replicas: 1
placement:
constraints:
- node.hostname == odroid # must run where the secret is mounted (and where the public ingress routes back to)
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
networks:
hermes_proxy:
@@ -138,12 +239,16 @@ networks:
admin:
driver: overlay
attachable: true
nginx_ingress:
external: true
configs:
squid_conf:
file: ./squid.conf
nginx_hermes_conf:
file: ./nginx-hermes.conf
brencher_state_proxy_conf:
file: ./brencher-state-proxy.conf
volumes:
squid_etc: