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hermes 6848d114a7 chore(hermes_squid): remove brencher-state-proxy
Drop the brencher-state-proxy sidecar from hermes_infra -- it is
no longer needed. The sidecar existed to relay /state from
brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link into the admin overlay; that relay is
unnecessary since brencher ingress handles the path itself.

Changes vs the brencher-state-proxy commit that was merged in #4:
- delete hermes_squid/brencher-state-proxy.conf
- remove the brencher-state-proxy: service block from
  hermes_squid/stack-compose.yml
- remove the brencher_state_proxy_conf: top-level config object
- drop brencher-state-proxy from the NO_PROXY / no_proxy lists
- update the surrounding comments
2026-08-29 22:47:36 +00:00
7 changed files with 30 additions and 341 deletions
-57
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@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
name: release
on:
push:
tags:
- 'v*'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: Tag to build (e.g. v0.1.0-test1)
required: true
default: v0.1.0-test1
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: log into Gitea Packages
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: gitea.rudolf.keenetic.link
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
- name: resolve version
id: version
run: |
if [ -n "${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}" ]; then
echo "VERSION=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF_NAME#refs/tags/}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
- name: build and push
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: connectivity_tester
file: connectivity_tester/Dockerfile
push: true
tags: |
gitea.rudolf.keenetic.link/hermes/connectivity_tester:${{ steps.version.outputs.VERSION }}
gitea.rudolf.keenetic.link/hermes/connectivity_tester:latest
- name: render stack-compose
run: |
mkdir -p out
TAG=${{ steps.version.outputs.VERSION }}
sed "s|\${version}|$TAG|g" connectivity_tester/stack-compose.yml > "out/docker-compose-$TAG.yml"
- name: upload rendered stack-compose
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: stack-compose
path: out/
-97
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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
# nginx config for the brencher-state-proxy sidecar.
#
# Path-locked reverse proxy for the brencher /state endpoint:
# - /state -> proxied to https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state
# - everything else -> 403 Forbidden
#
# This lets hermes-agent reach /state without going through squid's
# host-level allowlist (which can't see inside TLS) and without exposing
# the rest of brencher's surface area.
#
# Listen on 8080 (plain HTTP). No TLS -- this is a private internal
# API on the admin overlay, reachable only from inside the swarm. No
# host port is published.
#
# Upstream is the public URL on purpose -- the sidecar reaches the public
# brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link through the nginx-ingress overlay the same
# way any external client would, which means it doesn't need to be on the
# brencher container's private networks.
server {
listen 8080;
server_name _;
resolver 127.0.0.11 192.168.1.1 valid=30s ipv6=off;
resolver_timeout 5s;
# Tiny access log; default nginx format
access_log /var/log/nginx/brencher-state-access.log;
error_log /var/log/nginx/brencher-state-error.log warn;
# Healthcheck for swarm -- not /state, deliberately, so a 200 here
# doesn't accidentally imply /state is reachable from outside the
# allowlist.
location = /healthz {
access_log off;
return 200 "ok\n";
add_header Content-Type text/plain;
}
# The only allowed path. Exact match: query strings or trailing
# anything else fall through to the default 403.
location = /state {
set $brencher_upstream https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link;
proxy_pass $brencher_upstream/state;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
# Upstream is HTTPS; the sidecar trusts the LE-issued cert via
# the system CA bundle. SNI explicitly named so any future
# transparent-proxy middlebox doesn't break the handshake.
proxy_ssl_server_name on;
proxy_ssl_name brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link;
proxy_set_header Host brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_read_timeout 30s;
proxy_send_timeout 10s;
# Don't cache -- state should be live.
proxy_buffering off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
}
# Secondary brencher (runs on the docker host via host.docker.internal,
# reached as http://host.docker.internal:5002 -- same trick the brencher
# container itself uses in docker-compose.yml's extra_hosts). Only the
# /state2 path is exposed; everything else returns 403 like /state.
location = /state2 {
proxy_pass http://host.docker.internal:5002/state;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
# Cleartext HTTP upstream (port 5002), no TLS to wrangle.
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_read_timeout 30s;
proxy_send_timeout 10s;
proxy_buffering off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
}
# Catch-all: deny everything else, including /state/ (with trailing
# slash), /state?foo=bar (with query), and any other path.
location / {
access_log off;
return 403 "forbidden: only /state is allowed through this proxy\n";
add_header Content-Type text/plain;
}
}
+11 -49
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@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ services:
command: gateway run
user: "0:0"
networks:
# No admin overlay membership here: the sidecars (brencher-state-proxy,
# docker_socket_proxy) are on hermes_proxy too, so DNS resolves
# without expanding hermes-gateway's L3 footprint. The NO_PROXY
# list below ensures those requests skip squid.
# No admin overlay membership here: the docker_socket_proxy sidecar
# is on hermes_proxy too, so DNS resolves without expanding
# hermes-gateway's L3 footprint. The NO_PROXY list below ensures
# those requests skip squid.
- hermes_proxy
volumes:
- hermes_gateway_data:/opt/data
@@ -84,21 +84,21 @@ services:
HTTPS_PROXY: http://squid:3128
http_proxy: http://squid:3128
https_proxy: http://squid:3128
# The sidecars added in this PR (brencher-state-proxy, docker_socket_proxy)
# are reachable on the hermes_proxy overlay. They are NOT public services, so
# traffic to them MUST NOT be routed through squid (which can't reach
# them anyway and would 403 the request).
# The docker_socket_proxy sidecar is reachable on the hermes_proxy
# overlay. It is NOT a public service, so traffic to it MUST NOT be
# routed through squid (which can't reach it anyway and would 403
# the request).
# Comma-separated list. Format accepted by curl/requests/urllib:
# bare hostnames, IPs, CIDR ranges. Order doesn't matter; case-insensitive.
# 127.0.0.1 - loopback
# .local - mDNS / link-local (covers host.docker.internal)
# squid, hermes-gateway, hermes-agent - same-overlay services that
# hermes-gateway itself needs to talk to without going through squid
# brencher-state-proxy, docker_socket_proxy - the new sidecars
# docker_socket_proxy - the sidecar
# 10.0.0.0/8 - the swarm's typical overlay subnet (defensive: covers
# any IP-direct call that bypasses DNS)
NO_PROXY: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,brencher-state-proxy,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
no_proxy: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,brencher-state-proxy,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
NO_PROXY: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
no_proxy: localhost,127.0.0.1,.local,squid,hermes-gateway,hermes-agent,docker_socket_proxy,10.0.0.0/8
depends_on:
- squid
deploy:
@@ -193,42 +193,6 @@ services:
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
brencher-state-proxy:
# Path-locked reverse proxy for brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state.
# Lets hermes-agent reach /state without going through squid (which
# can't see inside TLS) and without exposing the rest of brencher.
# See hermes_squid/brencher-state-proxy.conf for the path rules.
image: nginx:alpine
hostname: brencher-state-proxy
extra_hosts:
# Lets the sidecar reach the secondary brencher at
# http://host.docker.internal:5002/state -- same trick the brencher
# container itself uses in its own docker-compose.yml.
- "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"
networks:
# hermes_proxy: same as docker_socket_proxy. hermes-gateway is
# already on this overlay, so DNS works. Egress is allowed despite
# the `internal: true` flag (which only blocks external ingress,
# not outbound traffic). The sidecar's upstream
# proxy_pass https://brencher.rudolf.keenetic.link/state is a
# public-internet HTTPS call, not a service-name lookup, so
# nginx_ingress membership is not required.
- hermes_proxy
configs:
- source: brencher_state_proxy_conf
target: /etc/nginx/conf.d/brencher-state-proxy.conf
deploy:
mode: replicated
replicas: 1
placement:
constraints:
- node.hostname == odroid # must run where the secret is mounted (and where the public ingress routes back to)
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
networks:
hermes_proxy:
driver: overlay
@@ -247,8 +211,6 @@ configs:
file: ./squid.conf
nginx_hermes_conf:
file: ./nginx-hermes.conf
brencher_state_proxy_conf:
file: ./brencher-state-proxy.conf
volumes:
squid_etc:
-39
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@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Custom entrypoint for the act_runner cache-server.
#
# The upstream image's /usr/local/bin/run.sh hardcodes `act_runner daemon`
# and ignores argv. So we replace the entrypoint here.
#
# cache-server also requires cache.external_secret to be set in config.yaml
# as a literal value (not a file path). We keep the value in a Docker
# secret and substitute it into a runtime copy of config.yaml before
# exec'ing act_runner.
set -eu
SECRET_FILE="${ACT_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/gitea_cache_secret}"
CONFIG_FILE="${CONFIG_FILE:-/cfg/config.yaml}"
if [[ ! -s "$SECRET_FILE" ]]; then
echo "cache-server-run: secret file $SECRET_FILE is missing or empty" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_FILE" ]]; then
echo "cache-server-run: config file $CONFIG_FILE not found" >&2
exit 1
fi
SECRET_VALUE="$(cat "$SECRET_FILE")"
# Render a copy of config.yaml with cache.external_secret replaced by the
# secret's literal value. /cfg/config.yaml is a read-only Swarm config mount,
# so we cannot edit it in place. Use a plain-file replacement — the
# upstream config.yaml has the form `external_secret: ""` (or any literal)
# on a single line, so a simple sed is safe.
RUNTIME_CONFIG="/tmp/config.runtime.yaml"
cp "$CONFIG_FILE" "$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
# Replace the value after `external_secret:` on a single line.
# Use a delimiter unlikely to appear in the secret.
sed -i "s|^ external_secret:.*$| external_secret: \"${SECRET_VALUE}\"|" "$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
exec /usr/local/bin/act_runner cache-server --config "$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
+18 -8
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@@ -70,16 +70,26 @@ runner:
- "ubuntu-22.04:docker://docker.gitea.com/runner-images:ubuntu-22.04"
cache:
# Enable cache server to use actions/cache.
enabled: true
# The directory to store the cache data.
# If it's empty, the cache data will be stored in $HOME/.cache/actcache.
dir: ""
# Point at the dedicated gitea_cache_server container on the `gitea` overlay.
# The runner's built-in cache server binds to an interface unreachable from
# per-job container networks, causing ~9 min/job wasted on
# "reserveCache failed: connect ETIMEDOUT" (see gitea/actions/runs/16 job #248).
host: "gitea_cache_server"
port: 37051
external_server: "http://gitea_cache_server:37051/"
# Read from the gitea_cache_secret Docker secret (see stack-compose.yml).
# The host of the cache server.
# It's not for the address to listen, but the address to connect from job containers.
# So 0.0.0.0 is a bad choice, leave it empty to detect automatically.
host: ""
# The port of the cache server.
# 0 means to use a random available port.
port: 0
# The external cache server URL. Valid only when enable is true.
# If it's specified, act_runner will use this URL as the ACTIONS_CACHE_URL rather than start a server by itself.
# The URL should generally end with "/".
# Requires external_secret below to be set to the same value on both this runner and the cache-server.
external_server: ""
# Shared secret between this runner and the external `act_runner cache-server`. Required when external_server
# (or `act_runner cache-server`) is in use: the runner pre-registers each job's ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN with the
# cache-server, and the cache-server enforces bearer auth + per-repo cache isolation.
external_secret: ""
container:
-36
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Custom entrypoint for the gitea_runner service.
#
# Same trick as cache-server-run.sh: act_runner requires cache.external_secret
# to be a literal string in config.yaml, not a file path. We keep the value in
# a Docker secret and substitute it into a runtime copy of config.yaml, then
# exec the image's own /usr/local/bin/run.sh (which handles registration +
# daemon).
set -eu
SECRET_FILE="${ACT_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/gitea_cache_secret}"
CONFIG_FILE="${CONFIG_FILE:-/cfg/config.yaml}"
if [[ ! -s "$SECRET_FILE" ]]; then
echo "runner-run: secret file $SECRET_FILE is missing or empty" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_FILE" ]]; then
echo "runner-run: config file $CONFIG_FILE not found" >&2
exit 1
fi
SECRET_VALUE="$(cat "$SECRET_FILE")"
# Render a runtime copy with the secret substituted in.
RUNTIME_CONFIG="/tmp/config.runtime.yaml"
cp "$CONFIG_FILE" "$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
sed -i "s|^ external_secret:.*$| external_secret: \"${SECRET_VALUE}\"|" "$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
# The upstream run.sh reads $CONFIG_FILE from the environment to pass
# --config to act_runner. Override it so registration + daemon both pick up
# the runtime copy with the substituted secret.
export CONFIG_FILE="$RUNTIME_CONFIG"
exec /usr/local/bin/run.sh
+1 -55
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@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@
# Gitea Actions stack. Uses a dedicated act_runner cache-server so that
# job-container networks can reach the cache backend via Swarm service DNS
# (gitea_cache_server:37051) instead of the unreachable IP the built-in
# cache server binds to per-job.
services:
server:
image: docker.gitea.com/gitea:1.27.0
@@ -23,7 +19,6 @@ services:
runner:
image: docker.io/gitea/act_runner:nightly
entrypoint: ["/usr/local/bin/runner-run.sh"]
environment:
CONFIG_FILE: /cfg/config.yaml
GITEA_INSTANCE_URL: "https://gitea.rudolf.keenetic.link"
@@ -31,51 +26,14 @@ services:
GITEA_RUNNER_NAME: "runner1"
GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS: "runner_label1"
# GITEA_RUNNER_EPHEMERAL: "1"
ACT_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/gitea_cache_secret
networks:
- gitea
# - nginx_ingress
configs:
- source: runner_config
target: /cfg/config.yaml
mode: 0444
- source: runner_run
target: /usr/local/bin/runner-run.sh
mode: 0755
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
secrets:
- gitea_cache_secret
deploy:
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
cache_server:
# The image's /usr/local/bin/run.sh hardcodes `act_runner daemon` and
# ignores argv, so passing `cache-server` via `command` doesn't help —
# the daemon path is always taken. We replace the entrypoint by
# mounting our own script via a Swarm config (file mount), then have it
# substitute the Docker secret literal into a runtime copy of
# config.yaml's cache.external_secret and exec act_runner.
image: docker.io/gitea/act_runner:nightly
entrypoint: ["/usr/local/bin/cache-server-run.sh"]
environment:
ACT_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/gitea_cache_secret
networks:
- gitea
volumes:
- cache_data:/root/.cache/actcache
secrets:
- gitea_cache_secret
configs:
- source: runner_config
target: /cfg/config.yaml
mode: 0444
- source: cache_server_run
target: /usr/local/bin/cache-server-run.sh
mode: 0755
networks:
nginx_ingress:
@@ -86,17 +44,6 @@ networks:
configs:
runner_config:
file: ./config.yaml
cache_server_run:
file: ./cache-server-run.sh
runner_run:
file: ./runner-run.sh
secrets:
gitea_cache_secret:
# Create once before first deploy (or to rotate):
# echo -n "$SECRET" | docker secret create gitea_cache_secret -
# Then `docker stack deploy -c stack-compose.yml gitea`.
external: true
volumes:
data:
@@ -105,5 +52,4 @@ volumes:
type: nfs
o: addr=192.168.1.96
device: :/root/volumes/gitea
# device: :/media/DATA/runtime/gitea
cache_data:
# device: :/media/DATA/runtime/gitea